Excise Tax Gross-Up
An excise tax gross-up is a contractual promise by a company to pay an executive an additional amount so that the executive is not left worse off after a special tax on certain change-in-control payments. In the United States, some change-in-control payments (often called 'parachute payments') can trigger an extra tax owed by the executive, and the gross-up covers that tax so the executive keeps the intended value. These provisions have drawn criticism and are generally viewed unfavorably by boards and governance observers.
An excise tax gross-up is a compensation arrangement designed to offset the excise tax imposed under U.S. Internal Revenue Code Section 4999 on 'excess parachute payments' as defined under IRC Section 280G, described in the evidence as a 20% additional tax applied to such payments. Under a full gross-up provision, the company makes an additional payment to the executive intended to completely offset the impact of the excise tax, effectively restoring the executive to the after-tax position they would have held absent the tax. In practice, related agreements may impose caps (evidence references caps ranging from $1 million to $35 million) and specify timing of the gross-up payment (one referenced agreement provided for payment on the first day of the seventh month following separation from service, consistent with deferred-compensation timing considerations). Because these provisions can shift a significant tax burden from the executive to the company and carry reputational sensitivity, they are generally disfavored in contemporary governance practice; the scope, availability, and tax treatment described here are specific to the U.S. federal tax framework and may not apply in other jurisdictions.
Why it matters
Excise tax gross-ups sit at the intersection of executive compensation and board accountability, and they carry significant reputational sensitivity. Because a full gross-up shifts the burden of a punitive tax from the executive to the company, the arrangement can substantially increase the total cost of a change-in-control event and expose the board's compensation committee to criticism from investors, proxy advisors, and governance observers. As the evidence notes, providing an excise tax gross-up is sensitive for boards given its poor reputation, and these provisions are generally viewed unfavorably in contemporary governance practice.
The underlying tax mechanic is what makes these provisions consequential. Under the U.S. federal tax framework, the excise tax described in the evidence is a 20% additional tax applied to 'excess parachute payments' under IRC Section 280G, and this tax is characterized as punitive. A gross-up promises to make the executive whole against that tax, which means the company may bear not only the excise tax itself but also the tax on the gross-up payment, compounding the cost. Because the arrangement can restore the executive to their intended after-tax position while leaving shareholders to absorb the incremental expense, alignment between pay outcomes and shareholder interests becomes a central concern for the board.
For governance professionals, the presence or revival of gross-up provisions is a signal worth scrutinizing during contract negotiation, disclosure review, and say-on-pay analysis. The scope described here is specific to the U.S. federal tax framework and may not apply in other jurisdictions; whether a given arrangement is advisable depends on the specific facts, the terms negotiated, and the board's own judgment. This entry does not assess the legality of any provision or predict how it will be received in a particular case.
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